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With few exceptions, Britain’s abandonment of Aden and retreat from the Gulf has been presented by contemporary commentators and later historians, in an almost Whiggish or Marxist manner, as a seemingly inevitable result of the retreat of the British Empire in the face of the inexorable march of Arab nationalism.​[1]​ Whereas contemporaries were intent on justifying this flight from Arabia, as a way of covering up their own less than glorious roles in events, historians have been concerned to chronicle it, sometimes by simply repeating the ‘official’ line. The last High Commissioner in South Arabia, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, wrote soon after the event: ‘We left without glory but without disaster. Nor was it a humiliation. For our withdrawal was the result not of military or political pressure but of our decision, right or wrong, to leave…It might have been worse…whatever was to come after us, the time for us to be there was over. And, if we were to go, it was better not to linger on.’​[2]​  Every line of Trevelyan’s apologia can be challenged, as can the exculpatory conclusions of a prominent historian on Britain’s exit from the Gulf: ‘It all turned out…exactly as the British had hoped all along but could hardly dare to believe would happen: a new state on good terms with Britain, no sharp breaks or ruptures, and with the new union [of Arab Emirates]still informally within the British imperial system.’​[3]​ Above all, what contemporaries and historians have in common is a desire to present a picture of the British having done ‘the right thing’ by leaving the inhabitants of southern and eastern Arabia to attend to their own affairs. This attitude is embodied in Trevelyan’s remark that ‘[t]he local boys had made good’, a reference to the murderous thugs of the National Liberation Front (the NLF) having seized power in Aden and the hinterland.​[4]​ It is designed to still any qualms about the manner of Britain leaving south Arabia and the Gulf. For, far from being an orderly ‘transfer of power’, or ‘transition’ from Britain to the successor states, the British fled Arabia in a mood of panic and confusion. It is not an edifying story, but it needs to be told.

The Scuttle: The Abandonment of Aden.

‘Sir Humphrey Trevelyan said…he would not want to be associated with a scuttle on Palestine lines…in no circumstances should we just abdicate.’​[5]​ 

‘Not since the scuttle from the Mandate in Palestine in 1948 had a British attempt at measured and deliberate decolonization ended so abjectly and unceremoniously.’​[6]​

On 27 November 1947 the United Nations Organisation voted to partition Palestine, and Britain counted down the days to her departure in May 1948, when Arabs and Jews were left to fight it out for the territorial spoils of war, or wars, since the struggle continues to this day as one of the running sores in the Middle East. Twenty years later, on 27 November 1967, Britain left her colony of Aden in a similar manner, which destabilised Arabia, the Persian Gulf and the wider region for many decades. There was no proper ‘transition’ process between the outgoing colonial administration and the new successor government. There was just a hurried evacuation of British personnel and perfunctory arrangements made in Geneva for a hand-over. The departing British High Commissioner, Trevelyan, had never met, let alone negotiated with his successors, the National Liberation Front (NLF), though he did know that they were a violent terrorist group. Britain had only recognised the NLF ten days before it left Aden for ever. Lord Shackleton’s delegation to the last-minute hand-over talks in Switzerland (which included discussion of a grant-in-aid) had been surprised to recognise some familiar faces in the NLF delegation, since they had been unaware of the various changes of allegiance during the dying days of the British administration. All this shows that the British government had no real idea who was to succeed them in Aden and South Arabia.  It was as if an important landed family had decided it could no longer afford the upkeep on their estate and had decided to abandon it, along with the well-appointed house and the loyal tenant- farmers to the depredations of a roving band of bandits, left the keys in a safe-deposit box in a Swiss bank, and promised to pay protection money! The NLF took up residence in Aden and the hinterland, drove out and often tortured and killed the faithful old British retainers, set up a cult-like Marxist-Leninist regime, became a menace to the neighbourhood and invited in the leaders of the cult, the Chinese and Russian communists, to help spread mayhem in Arabia, the Persian Gulf, the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean. How had this lamentable state of affairs come to pass? Why had the British government allowed itself to be intimidated out of Aden? Why had they simply abandoned their supporters, who had placed faith in Britain’s oft reiterated pledges, to their often grisly fate at the hands of these new Jacobins of South Arabia, in what some Britons who had served there called the ‘Great Betrayal’?​[7]​ Why had the British government left a strategic vacuum in South Arabia which affected the entire region? It was a major foreign policy reversal for Britain, and yet senior Foreign Office officials had been aware in 1965 of the difficulty of fixing a date for Britain’s departure from Aden ‘without leaving chaos behind…that we might therefore end up with two power vacuums, one in Aden and one in the Gulf.’​[8]​ Does the reason offered by Trevelyan, quoted above, that it was time for Britain to leave South Arabia stand up to scrutiny?  Certainly, the British left ‘without glory’, but it is it true to say that it was ‘without disaster’ for Britain and the people it left behind? As for it being ‘without humiliation’, it looks uncannily like those other national humiliations over Palestine and at Suez. In reassessing Britain’s abandonment of Aden one can see that it is a story of missed opportunities and of a transition deferred, until final disaster struck. What were the reasons for this catastrophe?

Aden’s importance derived from its strategic position at the south-western tip of Arabia, commanding the southern entrance to the Red Sea and the sea-routes to India and the Far East. As such, it served as a bunkering port for commercial shipping and the Royal Navy, as well as an entrepot for the trade of Yemen, South Arabia, Ethiopia, and the Horn of Africa. By 1959, following the Suez debacle and the Cyprus Emergency, it also served as the main British army, naval and air base in the Middle East. As such, it was the lynch-pin in British strategy east of Suez, as was demonstrated in the deployments to Kuwait in 1961, East Africa in 1964 and to Malaysia and Borneo, in the Confrontation with Indonesia between 1961 and 1966. The hinterland of Aden was a harsh, unforgiving land of broken mountains, plateaux, wadis and deserts. It was inhabited by wild and highly disputatious tribes who, when not scratching a living from the wretched earth were preoccupied with their running feuds. They gave their often perfunctory allegiance to a motley collection of shaikhs, amirs, saiyyids and sultans. With a rifle in his hands, the tribesman of south Arabia was a natural-born democrat, who believed in the power of the bullet rather than the ballot-box. It was for reasons of the sheer ungovernability of the hinterland that the Government of India, which had annexed Aden in 1839, had shied away from any involvement with the tribes of the interior. In the late nineteenth century, however, the encroachment of the Ottoman Turks from their fastnesses in the High Yemen had led to a modification of India’s policy, with a series of treaties being drawn up with the rulers of south Arabia, requiring them to place the conduct of their foreign relations in British India’s hands and not to cede any of their territory without prior permission. Responsibility for the observance of these treaties passed from Government of India and the India Office (its representative department in London)  to the British government and the Colonial Office in 1921 as part of the general assumption of control by that department over Middle Eastern affairs after the First World War. It was not until 1937, however, that the Colonial Office forced India to concede control over Aden itself, which became a Crown Colony  (though it was an integral ‘barbican’ and ‘sally-port’ for the defence of India, and had a large population of Indian merchants), on the grounds that its future lay in integration with the hinterland. In order to achieve this, and to ward off the unwanted territorial claims of the Imam of Yemen and the newly-minted King of Saudi Arabia, the Colonial Office continued its policy of pacifying the hinterland, dividing the protectorate into its western and eastern regions, concluding advisory treaties with the rulers and appointing British political officers as advisers, and raising tribal levies to keep the peace in their districts (such as the Aden Protectorate Levies and the Hadrami Bedouin Legion). 

The tribal rulers became increasingly dependent upon advice and subventions from their British advisers to keep their recalcitrant subjects in check. This, and the reform of their tribal councils, the daulahs, when combined with the growing, though limited, development aid to the rulers in the 1950s and 1960s, had the unintended effect of undermining the authority and influence of the tribal rulers.  It was a critical flaw in Colonial Office policy, which helps explain the collapse of British authority in the protectorates in 1967. This is a point which has been overlooked by most writers on this subject. If anything they argue the exact opposite,  that the lack of development in the protectorates had the effect of undermining the shaikhs, and therefore, British rule.​[9]​  But this is to interpret events from a strictly western perspective, which sees development aid as a benevolent act and therefore to be welcomed by the recipient. In fact, it was rejected by the tribesmen as unwarranted interference in their traditional way of life and their desire to use the only political institution open to them, the daulah, to arbitrate their disputes over their often hereditary rights and entitlements. By undermining the daulah as the only truly functioning instrument of government in the interior, the Colonial Office had made a rod for their own backs.  

It was the unwanted attentions of the Colonial Office, rather than the meddling of the Imam of Yemen and the new Egyptian leader, Nasser, which led to the tribal disturbances in the western Protectorate in 1954 and the rejection by the rulers of a proposal for federation. The Colonial Office took the hint and rowed back on its interventionist policy. Federation raised the thorny question of the future of Aden colony and its relationship with the protected states. Any alteration of Aden’s status depended upon its place in Britain’s strategic calculations east of Suez, but it was deemed too important in 1956 for the British government to relinquish control for the foreseeable future.  This attempt to delay the constitutional advance of Aden was an error since it drove the Sultan of Lahej, in the Western Protectorate, and the South Arabian League into the arms of Nasser and the Yemenis. Despite much that has been written on the subject, there was no great opposition in the colony and the Western Protectorate to a merger, only to its terms.​[10]​ Whereas the protectorate rulers and the leading merchants of Aden wanted a loose grouping, backed by a British defence guarantee, this was rejected by the radical nationalists of the Aden TUC, who wanted to kick the British out, overthrow the rulers and the Imam of Yemen and forge a union with their radical compatriots to the north.  The result of this was the separate political development of Aden and the protectorates. Whereas the Federation of the Arab Amirates of the South came into being in 1959, under British treaty guarantees of advice, protection, external and internal defence, and financial, economic and social aid, the radical nationalists of Aden boycotted the 1959 elections to the legislative council on the grounds that they were unrepresentative, since their supporters, the migrant Yemeni and Protectorate Arab workers, could not vote (though they had no such right back home). The Governor of Aden, Sir William Luce, put forward a bold plan in the late 1950s for the Colonial Office to grant Aden self-rule and allow it to seek admittance to the Federation. The perceived strategic importance of Aden meant the Macmillan government missed a golden opportunity to establish a federated state in South Arabia, under British protection and influence and with base facilities.​[11]​ Consequently, the task was to devise a formula which would still meet all these requirements and to do so before the local, regional and international dimensions changed to the detriment of both Britain and South Arabia.    


It was not until 26 September 1962 that the Aden legislature voted for the colony’s accession to the Federation, despite the violent street protests of the Aden TUC and its political offshoot, the People’s Socialist Party (PSP). That very night, an Egyptian-backed army coup in Sana overthrew the new Imam of Yemen and declared a republic. Four of the leaders of the PSP immediately went north to become ministers in the new republican government, to be followed by others after preferment and support for their planned revolution in the south. If the vote had occurred one day earlier, it is very likely that it would have gone against the merger. It was now a straight fight between the British, to put the federation on its own two feet, and the Yemeni-Adeni nationalists, backed by the Egyptians, to cut it off at the knees.    The solution was for the British to give sufficient financial aid and to protect the federation from its enemies. A complacent Colonial Office did neither while, unknown to it, the Adeni adepts of the Arab Nationalist Movement, in exile in Sana,  created the National Liberation Front of South Yemen (NLF), dedicated to the destruction of the Federation and British rule, and its replacement by a revolutionary new state. The NLF, with Egyptian backing, chose the tribes of the Radfan, a mountainous area in the amirate of Dhala, on the border with Yemen, to kick off their insurgency on 14 October 1963, a day celebrated ever after as the date of the ‘South Yemeni Revolution’.​[12]​ 

What was significant about the Radfan uprising was not that the tribes had engaged in their age-old method of airing their grievances, but that the Egyptians were so prepared, through their provision of arms, money and guidance, to stir up disaffection in the protectorates in order to undermine the British position in South Arabia. Behind the Egyptians were the Soviets, who had provided the military hardware and air transport  for Nasser’s foray into the Yemen.​[13]​ 

The new governor of Aden and high commissioner of the protectorates, Sir Kennedy Trevaskis, was aware from his long service in the Western Protectorate that the battle for South Arabia would be won or lost in the protectorates. It was for this reason that he persuaded Duncan Sandys, the Colonial Secretary, that if Nasser’s subversive campaign was to be defeated, then Britain would have to cede sovereignty over Aden (except the base areas) and confer independence upon South Arabia. If the Adeni nationalists had truly believed in independence per se, they would have welcomed the decision. But they were not free agents. The leader of the PSP, Abdullah al-Asnaj, had been instructed on his frequent trips to Cairo in 1963 to continue the campaign to drive the British out of South Arabia, a campaign given vocal support by Britain’s enemies in the United Nations and Europe. Sandys’s offer was greeted with a general strike in Aden and, in December, by an assassination attempt on the life of Trevaskis as he was about to board an aircraft at Khormaksar airport, en route to London for the constitutional conference to fix the date of South Arabia’s independence. Trevaskis and his wife cheated death but his deputy, George Henderson, and an Indian woman bystander were not so lucky. The result of this grenade attack was the imposition of a state of emergency in Aden and the suspension of the Trevaskis/Sandys plan.The transition had been deferred yet again.

Nevertheless, the Egyptian-inspired Radfan uprising had been fought to a standstill in June 1964 by British and federal troops, despite the attempt by the NLF, and some historians, to argue otherwise.​[14]​ Moreover, Trevaskis was hopeful of the ultimate success of his secret campaign against the Egyptians and the Republicans in Yemen through cross-border sabotage and subversion.  In the summer of 1964 the delayed constitutional conference meeting in London set the date of 1968 for independence for South Arabia. It was now a race against time to strengthen the federation so that it could survive as a new state. Any chance that this would happen vanished with the advent of the Labour Party to power in Britain in October 1964.​[15]​    

The Labour government of Harold Wilson was ideologically predisposed to favour the nationalist and socialist aspirations of the radical politicians and trade unionists of Aden over the interests of the hereditary rulers of the protectorates. Labour politicians had made this clear, not only in their protests in Parliament against the detainment of nationalists during the state of emergency, but in their various visits to Aden while in opposition at the invitation of the PSP (in particular, George Thomson, later Minister of State at the Foreign Office and subsequently Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs,  became the party’s trouble-shooter on Aden).​[16]​ The day before the British general election, a grimly farcical election had taken place in Aden which, despite the nationalist boycott, had led to the election as an ‘independent’  of the incarcerated Khalifah Abdullah Hasan al-Khalifah, the would-be assassin of Trevaskis and the actual murderer of George Henderson. Understandably Trevaskis refused to bow to the nationalist clamour for al-Khalifah’s release, but the new Colonial Secretary, Arthur Greenwood had no such qualms and, as an act of goodwill, allowed al-Khalifah to go free and take up his seat on the legislative council. This slap in the face for Trevaskis was followed by his sacking in late 1964 when he refused, on the grounds that it would lead to anarchy in South Arabia, to carry out Greenwood’s new policy of courting the radical nationalists of the Aden TUC and the PSP. In order to achieve this, the Labour Cabinet ministers, Greenwood, Healey, Stewart and Gordon-Walker were prepared to promise a military withdrawal from the Aden base and a unitary state.​[17]​ This was a repeat of the mistake that Attlee’s government had made in 1946 of promising the withdrawal of military forces from the Suez Canal Zone base, which became the default position of the Egyptians in all subsequent negotiations over a defence treaty. 

The futility of such a policy of surrender was amply demonstrated during the course of 1965 as the PSP committed itself to a terrorist strategy in Aden and the Federation, in order not only to put pressure on the British but to compete with the NLF for the shifting allegiance of the Adeni ‘street’ and the tribesmen of the interior. As Nasser sought an exit strategy from his disastrous foray into the Yemen, and at the same time to maintain control over the terrorist campaign against the British in South Arabia, he presided over the amalgamation of the PSP with the South Arabian League (SAL) in May 1965 to form the Organisation for the Liberation of the Occupied South (OLOS). A disappointed Greenwood sought to win back the PSP by inviting Asnaj and his high command to a constitutional conference in London in August 1965, only for Asnaj to stage a walk-out and return to Cairo to direct OLOS’s terror operations in Aden, leading to the murder of the speaker of the legislative assembly and the superintendent of police. The British government responded by suspending Aden’s constitution and restoring direct rule, much to the regret of Greenwood, the delight of the nationalists and the dismay of the federal rulers.  In effect, the Wilson government had declared war on the nationalists, whom they had been courting for the past year. The question now was whether they had the will to see it through.

The answer came swiftly on 22 February 1966 in the form of the announcement in the British Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence, Denis Healey, as part of a sweeping defence review of the position east of Suez, that Britain would withdraw from Aden colony and base by the end of 1968. This had been under serious consideration in Whitehall for the previous year. The killer blow, however, was that Britain would not defend the South Arabian Federation after independence. This was not only in direct contravention of the public statements made by Lord Beswick (a junior minister at the Colonial Office)  in November 1965, and Healey himself in January 1966, but the pledges made by the British government in 1959, when the Federation came into being, which were reiterated following the constitutional conference in London in July-August 1964. When Duncan Sandys drew this to the attention of the House of Commons, Healey tried to brush this aside, only to have to apologise the next day for having misled the House.​[18]​  Healey’s announcement effectively destroyed the last vestiges of British authority in South Arabia. Terrorist incidents multiplied at a time when the British security forces found themselves hampered by a lack of intelligence on the competing terrorist bands run by OLOS and the NLF, as well as concern by international bodies such as the Red Cross over internment procedures. Nasser reversed his pull-out from the Yemen, realising that he had only to maintain a footprint there to claim the credit for the British withdrawal from South Arabia. As if to celebrate the moment he presided over the merger of Asnaj’s OLOS with Qahtan al-Shaabi’s NLF into the deceivingly harmless FLOSY, the Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (though the Marxist-Leninist wing of the NLF was to split away later in the year). Seeing the writing on the wall, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia refrained from giving material and financial help to the now stricken South Arabian state.​[19]​ 

Having signalled its intention to abandon the Federation to its fate, the Labour government was without any policy worthy of the name. All it could do was to impose strictures on the operation of the security forces in Aden and the hinterland. Its weakness was reflected in its desperate diplomacy: the appeasement by the new Foreign Secretary, George Brown, of his ‘great friend’ Nasser; Thomson’s fruitless pursuit of the Adeni nationalists; the British government’s acceptance in May 1966, as the Foreign Office assumed responsibility for South Arabia from the Colonial Office (which became the Commonwealth Office),  of a UN resolution calling for UN supervised elections, always a sign of Britain losing her grip (as over Palestine and Cyprus); the UN mission to South Arabia in April 1967 (which ended in farce when the FLOSY refused to have anything to do with them); the Foreign Office’s despatch of the Labour M.P.,  and K.G.B.-M.I.5. double-agent Tom Driberg, to the Yemen and the Sudan to win over FLOSY ‘moderates’;  Lord Shackleton’s visit to Aden the same month which betrayed the Federal rulers by  advancing the date of withdrawal to January 1968, and Trevelyan’s appointment in May as the last high commissioner, on the understanding of no ‘scuttle’, as in Palestine, and an orderly withdrawal of British military and civil personnel.​[20]​ Trevelyan made his task harder by lifting the ban on the NLF, which unsurprisingly led to a spike in the incidence of murder and robbery in Aden to fund their terror campaign. 

The British government did not have the will to grab the opportunity offered by Nasser’s catastrophic defeat at the hands of Israel in the June 1967 War to reverse course and restore order and security in South Arabia. As a sop to King Faisal, however, who had warned Prime Minister Wilson of the dire consequences for Arabia and the Gulf of the British withdrawal from Aden, Brown announced on 20 June a series of defence measures for the ‘transition’ period which were intended to still the concerns of the Federal rulers and the Saudis, and at the same time secure a lucrative new defence contract with the desert kingdom.​[21]​ Brown’s proposed measures, based on Trevelyan’s withdrawal plan, were rendered more or less irrelevant on the very day they were made by the mutiny of elements of the South Arabian Army, the South Arabian Police and the Aden Police in the colony which led to the deaths of twenty-two British soldiers and the wounding of thirty-one more. Trevelyan refused to allow either the South Arabian Federal forces, who were eager to reclaim their tarnished honour but whom he did not trust, or the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, who had lost men to ambush, to restore civil order in Crater, the most affected area in Aden. Trevelyan and his advisers feared a massacre of British personnel not only in Aden but up-country. That his fears were unfounded was shown by the easy re-entry into Crater on 3 July of the Argylls, accompanied by their intrepid commander Colonel Colin ‘Mad Mitch’, Mitchell, to the skirl of the bagpipes, and their keeping the peace there for the next four and a half months. Labour’s revenge for Mad Mitch’s initiative was to indulge in carping criticism of the methods employed by the Argylls and to threaten the regiment with disbandment in 1968.​[22]​ Trevelyan later justified his inaction in Crater by coming up with a novel doctrine whereby diplomats were expected to protect British forces from harm, rather than the other way around. It is a doctrine which has been used by subsequent generations of British diplomats to justify British military withdrawal from a theatre of operations, the latest example being during the Iraq War in 2009.

At the end of June 1967 an increasingly terrified Trevelyan quietly advanced the date of the British evacuation from South Arabia to 20 November 1967.​[23]​ On cue, the NLF opened their final offensive to topple the Federal rulers. With the collapse of the Federal government by 5 September, Trevelyan recognised the NLF (with only a few thousand fighters) and FLOSY (with not many more) as the ‘representatives’ of the people of South Arabia and indicated his willingness to discuss with them the transfer of sovereignty. Ignoring Trevelyan as an irrelevance to the outcome, the NLF, now with the support of the South Arabian Army whom it had successfully subverted, fought and beat FLOSY for the prize of being the successor to the ancien regime.  The tangle that Trevelyan had got himself into, and the depths to which he had sunk, was shown by his threat to launch RAF bombing runs against the Shaikh of Beihan if he sought to regain his patrimony from the NLF, which had seized it with the aid of the South Arabian Army. Trevelyan’s logic also led him to sanction RAF strikes against a FLOSY raiding party crossing the Yemen border. Well might the Sharif of Beihan ruefully remark that: ‘In any dealing with the British it is better to be their enemy than their friend. If you are their friend, they will sell you. If you are their enemy there is a good chance they will buy you.’​[24]​ The final act was announced by Brown in the House of Commons on 2 November 1967, when he relayed the Cabinet’s decision to evacuate British personnel from Aden that month and to enter into negotiations with the NLF (in Geneva) for the transfer of power. The strange nature of those final proceedings have been remarked upon earlier in this chapter, as has the nature of Trevelyan’s departure on 28 November and his birthday review of  a fleet the size of the one assembled for the Suez operation in 1956. The irony of this was not lost on the Royal Marines bandsmen as they played out Trevelyan to the tune of  ‘Things Ain’t What they Used to Be’.​[25]​ Sic transit imperium.





The Double-Cross: The Retreat from the Gulf.   

‘Britain will stay in the Persian Gulf as long as necessary to maintain peace and stability, and the states on both sides of the Gulf understand and appreciate this policy.’​[26]​

‘We have decided to withdraw our forces from the Persian Gulf…[by the end of 1971]’​[27]​

On the very day, 30 October 1967, that the Labour Cabinet confirmed that Britain would leave Aden the following month, it despatched its Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Goronwy Roberts, to the Gulf to convey this decision to the local Rulers and to reassure them that this not mean a similar abandonment of Britain’s responsibilities there, namely the protection of her large oil interests and her treaty commitments. The last entailed British responsibility for the defence and foreign affairs of the protected states of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, the seven shaikhdoms of the Trucial Coast (so-named after their agreement to the truces enforced by Britain against piracy and maritime warfare in the nineteenth century), Bahrain and Qatar.​[28]​ Roberts visited the Gulf shaikhdoms  and Iran and gave a press conference on 13 November at which he stated: ‘Britain will stay in the Persian Gulf as long as is necessary to maintain peace and stability, and the states on both sides of the Gulf understand and appreciate this policy.’​[29]​ Other Labour ministers had made similar statements during the course of 1967.​[30]​ Yet just over two months later, on Tuesday, 16 January 1968, Prime Minister Wilson, stood up in the House of Commons and announced that the British government had ‘decided to withdraw our forces from the Persian Gulf’, as well as the Far East (with the exception of Hong Kong) by the end of 1971.​[31]​ Why had the Labour government decided to go back on its promises so soon after giving them? And what were the effects in the Gulf of such a momentous decision on what has been called ‘Black Tuesday’, which the Permanent Under-Secretary  at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Sir Paul Gore-Booth,  regarded as tantamount to ‘the abandonment of our claim to be a world power…?​[32]​ Others in the Office, responsible for Gulf affairs, referred to it as ‘the double-cross’.​[33]​

The answer to the conundrum about the Labour government reneging on its successive promises to stay in the Gulf lies in the very statements made by ministers from April to December 1967. They were all intended to conceal the fact that the government were preparing to withdraw from the Gulf all along. After the Cabinet approved on 11 April Denis Healey’s radical ideas for the rundown of British forces east of Suez, especially in the Far East, Healey had stated in the House of Commons that: ‘The Gulf is an area of such vital importance not only to Western Europe as a whole but also to world peace that it would be totally irresponsible for us to withdraw our forces from the area.’​[34]​ Despite such platitudes, withdrawal was under active consideration by the government at this time. The only difference of opinion was over when this should occur.  The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Sir Stewart Crawford, favoured a slow hand-over in the Gulf and ‘a smooth transition from one security system to another ‘. He was against fixing a date for withdrawal because it would ‘frighten the Rulers and reduce their readiness to co-operate with us in developing their States to the point where they no longer needed our protection’. He believed that it would also spark Arab nationalist propaganda and subversion and remove any chance of settling the outstanding territorial disputes between the Gulf states, leaving a legacy of instability.​[35]​ In contrast, the Defence Review Working Party for the Official Defence and Overseas Policy Committee of the Cabinet, in a report of 7 June (largely drafted by the FCO), talked about a British withdrawal by the mid -1970s:

After our decision to withdraw militarily as well as politically from Aden by 1968, no one really believes that we shall be able (or even wish) to stay indefinitely in the Gulf. By the mid-1970s we must expect a world where almost all colonial and quasi-colonial traces have disappeared and the overseas deployment of British power has contracted further than at present. If we have not gone from the Gulf, the pressures on us to go are likely to be very severe indeed.’​[36]​ 

The imminent loss of the Aden base was already beginning to have an effect on attitudes towards the military viability of Britain’s long-term future in the Gulf. This played in to the hands of the Treasury which, since 1960, had been sceptical about the need for a continued defence commitment in the Gulf, believing that ordinary commercial rules would protect Britain’s large oil interests there (they were to be rudely disabused of this notion during the oil price shocks of the 1970s). ​[37]​ But there was no mention of withdrawal from the Gulf in the Supplementary Defence White Paper of 18 July, which announced the ‘rebalancing’ of forces in Malaysia and Singapore.​[38]​ Yet such left-wing stalwarts of the Labour Cabinet as Tony Benn, Richard Crossman and Barbara Castle regarded this as the moment when the tocsin sounded for the death of ‘the British Empire east of Suez.’​[39]​ Still, the Foreign Secretary, George Brown, could state in a debate in the House of Commons on 20 July that: ‘In the present disturbed situation in the Middle East we must be particularly concerned about the stability and security of the Gulf area, for which we still have treaty responsibilities…Our forces are not in the Persian Gulf simply to protect our oil interests as such, but to maintain stability in the area.’​[40]​ This was the reassuring message that Roberts took to the Gulf in November, even though the FCO knew that it and the Ministry of Defence were working towards a simultaneous military and political withdrawal from the Gulf by the mid-1970s at the latest, and earlier ‘if the course of events permits.’ Any public announcement to this effect, however, was adjudged to be:

politically disastrous. Coming so soon after our assurances at the time of the Defence Review that we were determined to uphold our Gulf commitments it would destroy the Rulers’ confidence in Her Majesty’s Government and reduce their readiness to co-operate with us in developing their states to the point where we can disengage in good order.​[41]​

What precipitated the actual decision, publicly announced by Wilson on 16 January 1968,  to bring forward the withdrawal from the Gulf from the mid-1970s to the end of 1971, was of course the currency crisis in the autumn of 1967 which led to the devaluation of the pound on 18 November and cuts in public expenditure in order to secure a loan from the International Monetary Fund. The financial crisis had been caused, in part, by the reduction of oil supplies from the Gulf during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. This fact, which emphasised the need for security of supply, seems to have eluded the mandarins of the Treasury. The crisis gave the Treasury primacy in the determination of the timing, nature and ‘narrative’ on the withdrawal from the Gulf. The actual cost of the British military presence in the Gulf was minor (some £12 million in foreign exchange costs and £25 million in budgetary costs) when compared with the envisaged cuts in social expenditure of some £606 million. In order to persuade the Parliamentary Labour Party and the electorate of the need for swingeing cuts in social expenditure, however, the officials at the Treasury as well as the Labour Cabinet, coaxed along by Wilson and his new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Roy Jenkins, dressed up the fairly minor cuts in defence expenditure in the next few financial years as bigger than they were (especially if the projected £400 million cost of the F-111 strike aircraft was included), describing it in dramatic terms of the withdrawal from ‘east of Suez’. This meant, in the main, the pull-out from Malaysia and Singapore. The Gulf was thrown in for good measure, almost as an afterthought! (It should be noted, however, that the Cabinet was quite prepared to subsidise the new Marxist-Leninist regime in South Yemen to the tune of £12 million, though it is not clear how much of this was eventually forthcoming). ​[42]​  The date fixed for the withdrawal from the Gulf, namely the end of 1971, represented a compromise between the Treasury, who wanted to go by April 1971, and the FCO and MOD, who attempted to hold out for a March 1972 departure. The actual decision to leave the Gulf by the end of 1971 was made, therefore for domestic political reasons, which destroys the long-lasting myth that it was primarily due to financial and economic considerations.​[43]​  Although the Labour Cabinet was constitutionally responsible for this momentous decision, it is clear that certain Treasury, FCO and MOD permanent officials were not only behind it but believed in its necessity and provided the necessary  policy justifications to their political masters for public consumption.

The Americans were appalled by the British decision, upon which they had not been consulted. The fait accompli by Brown, on a flying visit to Washington in January 1968, was too much for the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, who had feared such a decision for several years, yet urged Brown: ‘For God’s sake, act like Britain.’ For President Johnson this was ‘tantamount to British withdrawal from world affairs’.​[44]​ His Administration had no intention of replacing Britain in the Gulf, though they were aware that the Soviets might take advantage of any opportunities to increase their influence in the region. The State Department impressed upon the British Embassy in Washington the importance of maintaining its political and economic, if not military, presence in the Gulf. American concerns may have delayed Britain’s departure by a few months, but they did not alter the decision or its implementation. Neither Wilson, his Cabinet, nor the FCO, seemed to be especially concerned at the reaction from Washington, and the latter’s downgrading of the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’. There was even a detectable trace of exuberant defiance by Wilson that Britain was now free to seek a new role in the world, one that centred on Europe rather than east of Suez. 

That was not a prospect that appealed to Lee Kuan Yew, the prime minister of Singapore,  who flew to London to berate the Wilson government for their failure of will in an unsuccessful attempt to have them reverse the decision. The rulers of the Gulf were stunned by it, conveyed as it was by Roberts who seems to have flown back to the Gulf to perform this invidious task as a matter of ‘honour’.  The Political Agent in Bahrain, Anthony Parsons, thought Roberts did not understand the magnitude of his new message to the al-Khalifah, as to other rulers in the Gulf:  ‘The Ruler and his brothers consider that they have been betrayed by an unvarnished volte face only two months after the reassurance of November 1967; and that they are being faced with the sudden and unilateral termination of 150 years of mutual relationship with no warning or genuine consultation.’ They accurately predicted the fall-out from this decision, being ‘highly sceptical of the chances of the Gulf States getting together to form a meaningful unity or of Iran allowing Bahrain to be included in any Gulf-wide mutual security system’. The Gulf rulers thought the precipitate departure date provided a ‘derisory period’ in which to resolve the long-standing territorial disputes and claims and to set up any sort of defensive system, given that none of the states concerned could defend themselves.​[45]​ Shaikh Sabah of Kuwait was concerned that the British withdrawal would ‘make way for Soviet influence, which was already spreading fast in the Yemeni Republic and South Yemen’.​[46]​ Yet when the Gulf Rulers offered to subsidise the costs of the continued British military presence in the Gulf, the proposal was dismissed by Denis Healey on the grounds that: ‘I don’t very much like the idea of being a sort of white slaver for Arab sheikhs…I think it would be a great mistake if we allowed ourselves to become mercenaries for people who like to have a few British troops around.’ Ironically, he did not have the same qualms about taking local money to maintain the garrisons in West Germany and Hong Kong. But Healey’s boorish, and offensive remarks, for which he was forced to apologise, reflected a wider feeling within Whitehall (in the FCO, the MOD and especially the Treasury) that ‘it was a mistake to get ourselves into a position of dependence on the Rulers which acceptance of the offer would imply’.​[47]​  

The effect of the announcement of Britain’s decision to withdraw from its military bases in the Gulf was to lift the lid on the endemic rivalries in the region which made British disengagement, in terms of a military and political transition, all the harder. First, there was the question of whether Britain was also intending to terminate its treaties of protection with the Gulf shaikhdoms, which underwrote these statelets, and if so what would replace them? The head of the FCO’s Arabian Department, M.S. Weir, thought there was ‘no question of trying, or even being thought to be trying, to promote another “Whitehall Federation” on the lines of South Arabia’, but the shock of the announcement of Britain’s withdrawal did have the effect of persuading the rulers to look again at the idea of a Federation of Arab Emirates, which came into being in name only on 30 March 1968.​[48]​  It immediately evoked a reaction from Iran, which restated its dubious historical claim to Bahrain.​[49]​ This second factor was to impede the progress of the Gulf shaikhdoms towards federation since Qatar and the Trucial shaikhs were loath to enter into any association with Bahrain which might require them to support the al-Khalifah family against Iran. They also feared that Bahrain would dominate such a federation, given its greater population, and its educated and wealthy merchant class. Thirdly, there were the old quarrels and enmities which divided the shaikhdoms and made the chances of political union seem remote. These antipathies centred on territorial disputes, between Bahrain and Qatar over the Hawar Islands and Zubarah; between Qatar and Abu Dhabi over the Khaur al-Udaid; between Abu Dhabi and Dubai over the alignment of their border; over the Buraimi Oasis divided between Abu Dhabi and Muscat/Oman but claimed by Saudi Arabia. For their part, Both Bahrain and Qatar were reluctant to support Abu Dhabi against Saudi Arabia. These rivalries determined the dynamics of the meetings held in 1968 to try and hammer out the future shape of the Federation (later Union) of Arab Emirates (UAE). Fourthly, there was the declaration by the opposition Conservative Party in Britain that, if it won the next general election, it would reverse the Labour government’s decision on military withdrawal from the Gulf.  This led the Gulf rulers to expect continued British protection and to drag their feet on federation. The former High Commissioner in Aden, Trevaskis, on a fact-finding tour for the Conservatives in the Gulf in November 1968 did not conceal his doubts about the future of the UAE from Shaikh Rashid of Dubai, comparing it to the ill-starred South Arabian Federation. The Political Agent in Bahrain, Parsons, thought it likely that Trevaskis, in his report to the Conservative leadership, would ‘probably be anti-UAE, pro a pattern of mini-states and…encouraging as regards a reversal of the decision to withdraw if the Conservatives win the next general election.’​[50]​ Not to be outdone, Trevaskis told Shaikh Isa of Bahrain that Parsons was ‘a slave of the Labour Party, and cannot speak his own mind…’​[51]​   Whatever Trevaskis may have told the Conservatives on his return, the FCO diplomats in the Gulf gave the Leader of the Opposition, Edward Heath, a rough ride when he toured the Gulf in March 1969, accompanied by his private secretary (and later a Conservative Foreign Secretary), Douglas Hurd.​[52]​  The diplomats were worried that any pledge by Heath to reverse, when in government,  the decision to withdraw would remove the incentive of the rulers towards federation, arouse Arab nationalist, Saudi and Iranian opposition and lead to ‘an Aden-type situation’.​[53]​ 

The FCO were not the only ones to be worried that Britain might not leave the Gulf on time. The Shah, encouraged by the British Ambassador in Tehran, Denis Wright, broke the deadlock resulting from his reassertion of the Iranian claim to Bahrain, which in turn impeded progress on federation, by agreeing on 9 March 1970 to the implementation of the Anglo-Iranian accord of December 1969 calling for an UN-supervised referendum to be held on the future of Bahrain. This resulted, in April, in an overwhelming vote in favour of independence, which was endorsed by the UN Security Council the following month. Although the FCO had successfully removed one obstacle to Britain’s exit from the Gulf, others remained. One lay in the Saudi threat to the Shaikh Zayid of Abu Dhabi in May 1970 to refuse to recognise the federation unless the latter met Saudi territorial claims to a great swathe of Abu Dhabi, from Khaur al-Udaid on in the west, to the Batin-Liwa tract in the south (where lay the newly-discovered al-Shaiba/Zarrara oil structure), to the Buraimi Oasis in the north-east.​[54]​  The FCO proceeded to bring pressure on Shaikh Zayid to accede to Saudi claims, even though in doing so Britain was contravening the terms of her own, still existing, treaty rights and obligations to Abu Dhabi. 

Whatever Heath and the Conservative Party might think about the future of Britain’s position in the Gulf, the FCO had plotted its exit strategy and intended to adhere to it. This became a live question when the Conservatives unexpectedly won the June 1970 election and came to power. They had pledged both in their election manifesto and their address in reply to the Queen’s Speech on 6 July not to shirk Britain’s responsibilities in the Gulf. Yet it is clear that the new Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, did not know at first how best to proceed. He turned for answers to an old Gulf hand, the former Political Resident, Sir William Luce, whom he sent to consult the Rulers in the summer of 1970. Both Luce and his former colleagues in the ‘Office’ presented a united front to Home, arguing against a reversal of the decision on withdrawal, or even a postponement, as it would remove the incentive of the rulers to organise their own futures. It would also run contrary to the opinions of the Shah of Iran, the King of Saudi Arabia and Colonel Nasser of Egypt, whom the FCO were anxious to appease in the expectation, unwarranted as it proved, that these regional powers would guarantee the future stability of the Gulf. This convenient illusion led Luce and the FCO (who, at heart, knew better) to make another leap of faith, arguing against any specific new British defence commitment in the Gulf after the military withdrawal and the termination of the exclusive agreements (of protection) by the end of 1971. Luce went so far as to predict that ‘there is very unlikely to be any identifiable threat of external aggression (including support by a contiguous territory of internal revolt) against which it could be in HMG’s interest to undertake a defence commitment to the Union [UAE]’.​[55]​  That this prediction did not even survive contact with reality before Britain left the Gulf, let alone after it, did not dissuade the FCO from its chosen course. It succeeded, given Luce’s stature, in convincing Heath that his government should force the Rulers to unite and ‘make it clear to them that we could not remain in the Gulf on the present footing.’​[56]​  Announcing this decision to the House of Commons on 1 March 1971, Home stated that the Conservative government would offer a Treaty of Friendship to the UAE and, as a fig-leaf to cover the absence of a new defence agreement, would turn over the Trucial Oman Scouts to form the nucleus of the new Union army, provide training teams, and engage in joint exercises and naval port visits (all of which continue to this day).​[57]​  It is with some justification that Denis Healey mocked the Conservatives for their own about-face on the Gulf. 

It now remained for Luce and the FCO to tie off the loose ends of Britain’s remaining involvement in the Gulf to ensure a swift exit by the end of 1971. In order to achieve this they resorted to the tactics of the suq. It was made clear to Shaikh Zayid that if he failed to satisfy the territorial demands of King Faisal and conclude a settlement with him by the end of 1971 (which would form the boundaries of the UAE), then he would have to face the wrath of the Saudi ruler on his own, for Britain would not come to his aid. Abandoned by Britain, Zayid had no real choice but to bow to Saudi demands, ceding territory to the west (Khaur al-Udaid, which gave the Saudis territorial access to the Lower Gulf for the first time) and to the south (among the oilfields of the al-Shaiba/Zarrara structure). Luce used the same tactic with regard to the two Qawasim shaikhdoms of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah, whose islands, respectively, of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, equidistant between the Persian and Arabian shores, were claimed by the Shah as his reward for waiving his dubious claim to Bahrain.  Luce made it clear in June 1971 to  Shaikh Khalid ibn Muhammad of Sharjah and Shaikh Saqr ibn Muhammad of Ras al-Khaimah that Britain would not defend them if the Shah decided to take the islands by force, so they had best come to an agreement with the Shah. Short of money, and tempted by prospective oil royalties, Shaikh Khalid, succumbed to Persian persuasion and an accommodation was reached in November. Shaikh Saqr, the ‘Napoleon of the Gulf’, held out with the support of the Iraqi government, so was debarred from joining the UAE when it was proclaimed on 18 July. Bahrain declared its independence on 14 August and Qatar followed suit on 1 September, both becoming members of the Arab League and the UN.  Luce agreed with Iran that the British government would not oppose the Iranian occupation of the Tunbs (owned by Ras al-Khaimah) after the formal inauguration of the UAE on 2 December, and the commencement of the Treaty of Friendship with Britain since there was no  obligation on Britain to defend Ras al-Khaimah. Anxious to claim a cheap victory at Britain’s expense, to compensate for his ‘concession’ over Bahrain, the Shah appeared to break the agreement by seizing Abu Musa and the Tunbs on 30 November. The Royal Navy’s carrier group, on station just outside the Strait of Hormuz, did nothing to stop him. It has been said that there was no collusion between Britain and Iran over the Iranian occupation of the islands on the eve of the British withdrawal.​[58]​ The documents show otherwise. Luce connived, through secret discussions with the Shah, over the timing of the Iranian takeover of the islands on 30 November, three days before the official British withdrawal from the Gulf.​[59]​ In colluding with the Shah, Luce had betrayed his principles and his erstwhile protégés as one of the last guardians
 of the Gulf. This shows how the process of disengagement, or transition, in the Gulf had corrupted the integrity of the individuals involved.

The hasty nature of Britain’s exit from the Gulf is symbolised in the farcical way in which it was wound up. What should have been a solemn ceremony in Dubai on 1 December between the outgoing Political Resident, Sir Geoffrey Arthur, and the Rulers of the six emirates, involving the cancellation of the British treaties of protection, became mixed up with the drafting of a proclamation banning unlicensed demonstrations in Dubai, Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah, which had broken out as a result of the Iranian seizure of the islands. Shaikh Khalid of Sharjah put Arthur on the spot by demanding an explanation of the Iranian  fait accompli. The chaos continued into the next day, as Arthur signed the new agreements between Britain and the UAE while pressmen and photographers stood on the tables and blocked the doorways. Arthur thought ‘it was little short of a miracle that nobody was injured and that the documents were retrieved intact.’ Julian Walker, the Political Agent in Dubai, described how: ‘Along with the UAE rulers, we literally had to climb out of the window on to the beach side of the villa in order to see the raising of the flag’, and the 21-gun salute.​[60]​ So came to end 150 years of the British presence in the Gulf.

Actions have consequences, and the British withdrawal from the Gulf is no exception. Despite what has been claimed, it resulted in the very instability that the FCO had trumpeted as the main reason why Britain should leave the Gulf by the end of 1971.​[61]​  In the early months of 1972 the Lower Gulf was rocked by coups, first in Sharjah, where Shaikh Khalid was killed by the former ruler Shaikh Saqr, aided and abetted by Iraq and Ras al-Khaimah, for ‘giving away’ Abu Musa to the Iranians. Order was soon restored by the ruling family but it was part of the backwash from Britain’s exit from the Gulf. The Amir of Qatar soon followed, overthrown by his family and the army, but since his father-in-law was Shaikh Rashid of Dubai, it poisoned relations with the UAE from the start. The new Amir of Qatar, Shaikh Khalifah bin Hamad, accused the UAE of being ‘no Union at all’. Even the new British Ambassador to the UAE, and former Political Agent in Abu Dhabi,  C.J. Treadwell, admitted that: ‘The UAE is a federation of seven disparate states controlled by ruling families whose one common characteristic is an inability to comprehend the meaning of modern political government’.​[62]​  Since Shaikh Zayid and Shaikh Rashid were ‘the cornerstone of the Union’, he thought it would collapse if they ever fell out. 

In their rush to leave the Gulf, the FCO did not explore the real option of a ‘Greater Oman’, a more natural political arrangement for the Trucial Shaikhdoms, in federation with the Sultanate of Oman, than the failed attempt to merge them with Qatar and Bahrain. Such an arrangement would have aroused the opposition of Saudi Arabia and Iran, however, thus undermining the FCO’s attempt to encourage these traditional territorial poachers in the Gulf to become its new gamekeepers of Western interests in the Gulf,  in line with the new ‘Twin-Pillars’ policy of the Nixon Administration. It was a comforting illusion, which the next decade was to show, helpfully fostered by the glittering prospect of further lucrative arms contracts, following the securing in 1970, as Britain negotiated with Iran on the Gulf, of a £100 million contract for the supply of the new Chieftain tank to the Shah’s army (for which the middleman received a knighthood). 
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